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Abstract Causal meanings in verbs such as cause, enable and prevent have been
analyzed as having two components that correspond to two interacting forces or
tendencies: one associated with the agent and one with the patient (Talmy 2000;
Wolff 2007). In this research we extend a force-dynamic analysis to a wider range
of causal and quasi-causal expressions such as lead to, because, and after. The
“structural causal pluralism hypothesis” (Copley & Wolff 2014) is not supported;
instead force dynamics is shown to be relevant to expressions throughout syntactic
structure. We find that the applicability of the classical force-interaction analysis
depends on (i) whether an Agent/Causer is represented in the syntax, and (ii) what
kind of causing entity is conceptually represented: either one that generates its own
force or one whose force emerges from an interaction with a field in the sense of
Copley & Harley (2015) (e.g., a gravitational field). The latter case, we propose,
suggests a criterion for force individuation. This account allows us to identify several
classes of causal expressions and to further map out the division of labor between
the grammatical and conceptual levels.
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1 Introduction
The causal meanings of certain verbs have been argued to involve two interacting
forces or tendencies (Talmy 2000; Wolff 2007)1. One of the forces is associated
with the agent and another with the patient, and the kind of interaction between them
varies by verb.
For example, the main verb cause is analyzed as describing a kind of scenario,
call it CAUSE, in which the agent exerts a force that opposes and is stronger than the
* This work was supported in part by a National Science Foundation grant “Causal illusions and the
perception of forces” (BCS-1354088) to Phillip Wolff.
1 The terms force and tendency refer to the same kind of abstract entity; in different cases one term or
the other will be more natural, but this does not correspond to an ontological difference.
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Figure 1 Force-interaction analysis of cause: CAUSE
Figure 2 Force-interaction analysis of enable: ENABLE
force exerted by the patient. The force associated with the agent is not in concordance
with (not oriented toward the same direction as) the force associated with the patient.
Forces can be represented with vectors in an abstract space, such that the strength of
the force is represented by the magnitude of the vector, and the abstract direction
of the force (i.e., toward or away from a goal endstate) is represented by the spatial
direction of the vector. The patient (P) and agent (A) vectors are summed to get a
resultant vector (R), as in the representation of CAUSE in Figure 1.
Enable, on the other hand is argued to describe a kind of scenario, call it EN-
ABLE, in which the agent’s force is in line with the patient’s force, so that the forces
associated with the agent and the patient are concordant with each other (Wolff &
Song 2003; Wolff 2007; contra Talmy 2000). This is shown in Figure 2.
Prevent would describe a kind of scenario PREVENT, as in Figure 3, in which the
agent’s force is oriented away from the goal endstate, and opposes and is stronger
than the patient’s force, which itself is oriented toward the goal endstate. As in
CAUSE scenarios, the force associated with the agent and the patient are not in
concordance with each other.
Support for the psychological reality of such meanings has been shown exper-
imentally. For example, Wolff (2007) showed subjects animations of agents and
patients with various configurations of their vectors, and asked subjects whether a
given configuration corresponded to certain verbs. The key finding was that partici-
pants’ descriptions of events were indeed sensitive to the two forces in the expected
ways. Descriptions involving enable and prevent required that the patient force be
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Figure 3 Force-interaction analysis of prevent: PREVENT
oriented towards the final result. Finally, descriptions involving cause and prevent
required that there be opposition between the agent and patient forces. Descriptions
involving cause and enable required that the resultant vector be directed towards the
final result.
We wondered whether other expressions of causation would show similar inter-
actions between agent and patient forces. For example, does because, like cause,
necessarily make reference to a CAUSE scenario? Intuitively, this does not seem to
be the case: Because seems at least in some circumstances to be compatible with an
ENABLE scenario as well (Copley & Wolff 2014: 55).
To see this, consider (1a) and (1b). Under the assumption that because has the
same meaning as cause, the sentence with because in (1b) should also be false.
This is because conceptually, the drugs are a mere enabling condition (associated
with a force concordant with the Lance Armstrong-associated force) rather than a
true cause (which would require Lance Armstrong not to be associated with a force
oriented toward winning seven Tours de France). However, (1b) is true. The truth of
(1b) seems to indicate that the meaning of because is weaker than that of cause, i.e.,
it can be used truthfully in both CAUSE and ENABLE scenarios.
(1) a. Drugs caused Lance Armstrong to win seven Tours de France. false
b. Lance Armstrong won seven Tours de France because he took drugs. true
We wondered why because has a weaker meaning. There could be two possible
hypotheses for why this might be the case. One possibility explains the difference
in meaning by means of two different conceptualizations of causal meanings. The
other explains the difference under a single conceptualization of causation (force
dynamics), but where the key difference between because and cause is that, unlike
cause, because does not grammatically represent an agent force, and therefore cannot
explicitly represent force interaction.
1.1 Structural causal pluralism hypothesis
The first possibility is that the causal meanings in (1a) and (1b) reflect two different
theories of causation. Theories of causation can be divided into two kinds. “De-
pendency theories” define causation in terms of dependencies between propositions
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(e.g., Lewis 1973; Dowty 1979; Pearl 2000). All that dependency theories require is
that the causal factor in some way make a difference in the result, whether by means
of causation or enabling.2
“Production theories” define causation in terms of the eventualities themselves,
without reference to propositions, by means of configurations of forces or trans-
missions of conserved quantities. Force-dynamic theories of causation are thus
production theories. Production theories, unlike dependency theories, can make the
distinction between CAUSE and ENABLE scenarios as we have seen above. So, if
because were making reference to a dependency theory of causation while cause
were making reference to a production theory, this would explain the contrast in (1).
But why would two theories of causation be used for these two different expres-
sions? Copley & Wolff’s (2014) “structural causal pluralism hypothesis” proposes
that causal meanings in the cartographic region of phrase structure that deal with
events (AspP and below; see, e.g., Ramchand & Svenonius 2014 and references
therein) use force dynamics, while causal meanings of connectives, which take
propositional arguments, use dependency causation. This would entail, as desired,
that because would fail to distinguish CAUSE and ENABLE scenarios, while cause
would distinguish CAUSE and ENABLE scenarios. And in general, other verbs
(e.g., leads to, results in) would be expected to behave like cause (because any
representation of causation within the verb phrase would have to be force-dynamic),
and other clausal connectives would be expected to behave like because (because
any representation of causation above AspP would have to be constructed from
propositions, via a dependency theory).
1.2 Forces-everywhere hypothesis
Another possible explanation for the contrast in (1)—in a sense the null hypothesis—
is that there are not two theories of causation relevant to the expression of causation
in language but only one. Given the need to sometimes distinguish CAUSE from
ENABLE scenarios, it follows that the putative single theory must be a production
theory, rather than a dependency theory. But it also must be explained why sometimes
CAUSE and ENABLE scenarios are not distinguished, as in the case of because.
As can be seen by comparing Figures 1 and 2, the difference between CAUSE
and ENABLE scenarios has to do with the relationship between the patient and agent
vector. In the case of CAUSE, the agent and patient vectors are not concordant, and
in the case of ENABLE, the agent and patient vectors are concordant. The notion
of concordance requires the representation of two vectors. Thus, in cases where
either the agent or patient force is not specified in the denotation, concordance or its
2 See Dowty (1979: 106-109) for an attempt to work around this limitation within a dependency theory
framework.
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absence can not be determined. So, given that concordance is what distinguishes
CAUSE from ENABLE, in such cases, we would not expect CAUSE and ENABLE
to be distinguished.
On this hypothesis, there are a number of factors that might be expected to
influence whether two forces are represented. Here we will investigate two such
factors, one grammatical and one conceptual: first, whether an Agent/Causer role is
assigned, and second, whether two forces can be conceptually individuated.
1.2.1 Assignment of an Agent/Causer role
Assigning an Agent/Causer role would seem to be necessary in order to have interact-
ing forces in the denotation. Having interacting forces in the denotation would seem
to be necessary to distinguish CAUSE from ENABLE scenarios. Thus, a clausal
connective such as because would also not be expected to distinguish CAUSE and
ENABLE scenarios because it does not assign an Agent/Causer role (not being a
verb). We would also expect that verbs that don’t assign an Agent/Causer role would
not be able to distinguish CAUSE from ENABLE. Two such causal verbs are lead to
and result in. For background, note that some nominals refer to entities as in (2a).
Others refer to eventualities as in (2b). Although both are grammatically of type
e, they have different kinds of referents on the conceptual level, either entities or
eventualities (this is along the lines of Roy & Soare 2013).
(2) a. Entity-referring: the officer, the traffic light
b. Eventuality-referring: the storm, the officer’s gesture, the traffic light’s
changing
The causal predicates lead to and result in—unlike, e.g., cause—do not accept
an entity-referring subject at all. Their subject cannot refer to an entity, as in (2a),
but rather must refer to an eventuality, as in (2b).
(3) a. #The officer/#the traffic light led to/resulted in the woman’s walking up to
the man.
b. The officer’s gesture/the traffic light’s changing led to/resulted in the
woman’s walking up to the man.
The infelicity of (3a) highly suggests that the subject cannot have an Agent/Causer
role. Thus, under the forces-everywhere hypothesis, lead to and result in are pre-
dicted to not distinguish CAUSE and ENABLE.
On the other hand, the verbs that do allow entity-referring subjects also allow
eventuality-describing subjects.
(4) a. The officer allowed/enabled/caused/forced/influenced/made us (to) leave.
437
Copley, Wolff, and Shepard
b. The storm/The officer(’s gesture)/the traffic light’s changing allowed/en-
abled/caused/forced/influenced/made us (to) leave.
On the forces-everywhere hypothesis, we would expect those in (4) to distinguish
CAUSE and ENABLE. The idea is that the verbs in (4) explicitly represent an
agent force through the Agent/Causer role (whether filled by an eventuality-referring
nominal or an entity-referring nominal). The verbs in (3), however, we expect not to
represent an agent force in their denotation. Thus, we would expect these verbs not to
be sensitive to a CAUSE/ENABLE distinction, since by hypothesis, to express such
a distinction, both the agent and patient vectors must be represented, and in these
verbs the agent vector is not represented, because there is no syntactic Agent/Causer
role.
1.2.2 Force generation and the individuation of forces
On the forces-everywhere hypothesis, another factor that might be expected to
influence whether force interaction is represented, and thus whether CAUSE and
ENABLE are distinguished, whether two forces are conceptually individuated. This
has to do with the way in which the causing force is generated. Some causal verbs,
such as make and force, seem to distinguish between an animate force-generating
cause, and an inanimate, non-force-generating cause.
(5) The officer/The storm/#The traffic light made/forced the woman (to) walk up
to the man.
An officer and a storm both qualify as force-generating entities as they generate their
own force (Wolff, Jeon, Klettke & Li 2010). On the other hand, a traffic light, while
it ultimately has an influence over whether a person crosses the street, does not on
its own generate a force that compels the person to cross the street.
But to take a step back, how does the traffic light influence the person if not by
generating a force? The answer comes from the notion of a field (Copley & Harley
2015). A field is an abstract object that, if an entity of the correct kind is placed in it,
generates a force on that entity. For instance, the earth’s gravitational field is such
that if an entity with mass is placed in it, a force on the entity is created. This force,
in the case of gravity, is a physical force proportional to the mass of the entity, and
directed toward the center of the earth. This abstract notion of field can be extended
to fields that generate other physical forces or tendencies, such as the tendency of
fruit to ripen when at room temperature, as well as to fields that psychosocially
generate forces such as intentions. For example, a social sense of what other people
are doing (the field) generates in a person (the entity) an intention to do what other
438
Force interaction in the expression of causation
people are doing (the tendency).3
Intentions can be modeled with vector-like quantities just like physical forces
(Talmy 2000; Wolff 2007). In the case of the police officer, a psychosocial force is
generated by the officer; this is the agent force. The officer has a certain intention, and
because of the officer’s social power, the officer’s intention has a greater magnitude
than the pedestrian’s intention. Generally, in the case of a police officer and a
pedestrian, if intention is pitted against intention, it is a CAUSE scenario—the
officer wins.
Unlike a police officer, a traffic light cannot have an intention. Nonetheless, there
is still a way for a traffic light to influence the scene, through the social significance
of red and green traffic lights. This social significance is a psychosocial field. That
is, when a person who knows what traffic lights mean is placed at a particular spot in
an intersection with a red or green light, that configuration creates a certain kind of
intention in the person. So even though the traffic light may do essentially the same
job as the police officer, there is a difference: When there is a traffic light, there is
no imparting of an external force upon the patient. Rather, the traffic light invokes a
field that results in the creation of a force on the person. As a consequence, there
are not two entities with intentions, but only one, the pedestrian. Thus, in the traffic
light condition, there is no Talmian interaction between two tendencies.
The origin of the force associated with the traffic light is in the woman’s mind,
not in the traffic light itself. So is the origin of her pre-existing intention to cross
the street. We propose that the criterion in (6), reminiscent of proposals for event
individuation as in Davidson (1969), forbids us from treating two forces whose
origin is in a single entity as two forces. Rather, they must be summed and treated
as a single force. So while in the officer condition, there is an interaction between
two forces, in the traffic light condition, there is only one force.
(6) Force individuation criterion: Two forces that have their origin in the same
entity must be summed at the conceptual level together into a single force.
The criterion in (6) is a conceptual, not a grammatical criterion. We hypothe-
size that such force individuation is a factor in determining whether there is force
interaction, and thus whether there is a CAUSE/ENABLE distinction. That is, we
expect cases with force-generating causes such as a police officer to involve the
representation of two forces, and therefore to distinguish CAUSE and ENABLE.
It’s not a priori clear how force individuation and assignment of an Agent/Causer
role should interact, but under the forces-everywhere hypothesis, we expect both
3 Talmy analyzes physical forces and intentions with exactly the same kind of theoretical object. Such
a view ignores the propositional content of (many) intentions and the lack of propositional content in
physical forces (Copley To appear). This difference can be elided here, however.
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of these factors to have an impact on whether CAUSE and ENABLE scenarios are
distinguished.
2 Predictions
In order to decide between the structural causal pluralism hypothesis and the forces-
everywhere hypothesis, we set out to investigate a number of verbal predicates
(cause, make, force, influence, enable, allow, lead to, and result in) as well as the
clausal connectives because, and, and after. As we have seen, predicates such as
cause, make, force ... seem to take an Agent/Causer, while lead to and result in
do not take an Agent/Causer. The connectives and and after are of course only
“quasi-causal”: a causal scenario can be pragmatically inferred even though they
themselves do not supply causal meaning.
(7) a. Verbs with Agent/Causer: cause, make, force, influence, enable, allow
b. Verbs without Agent/Causer: lead to, result in
c. Clausal connectives: because, and, after
Thus, if the structural causal pluralism hypothesis is correct, then the following
prediction is made:
(8) Prediction (structural causal pluralism hypothesis): Verbs should distinguish
CAUSE from ENABLE, and connectives should fail to distinguish CAUSE
from ENABLE.
If, on the other hand, the forces-everywhere hypothesis is correct, then the following
predictions are made:
(9) Predictions (forces-everywhere hypothesis):
a. Assignment of an Agent/Causer role should be associated with distinguish-
ing CAUSE from ENABLE.
b. Force-generating causes should be associated with distinguishing CAUSE
from ENABLE.
3 Methods
We tested these hypotheses in an experiment in which people saw animations of
various types of interactions. Two main factors were manipulated: (i) the direction
of the tendency of the patient (CAUSE vs. ENABLE) and (ii) the manner in which
the force was created by the conceptual cause (force-generating entity vs. non-force
generating entity).
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The animations depicted an urban scene in which a woman (the conceptual pa-
tient) approached an intersection of two streets. The woman indicated her proclivity
to move in a particular direction, by pointing toward one of two possible corners of
the intersection. She either pointed toward a corner in which a man was standing or
toward a corner that was empty. The conceptual cause in the situation was either a
police officer (force-generating) or a traffic light (non-force-generating).
Six-hundred and sixty Amazon’s Mechanical Turk workers participated in the
experiment.
Three sets of six animations were generated from the animation package 3D
Studio Max. Each animation depicted a city scene in which a woman walked to an
intersection, paused, and then crossed a street. In one set of animations, a police
officer directed the woman to walk in one of two directions. One direction brought
the woman to a man standing at one of the corners. The other direction brought the
woman to a corner without the man. Similar animations replaced the officer with a
traffic light. Each animation lasted 522 frames and was played at approximately 30
frames/second.
Each participant watched each animation, and was asked after each animation to
rate several sentences on a scale of 0 = very unacceptable to 100 = very acceptable.
The sentences used were those in (10) and (11) below:
(10) Officer condition:
a. The officer’s gesture caused/enabled/made/forced/allowed/influenced the
woman to walk up to the man.
b. The officer’s gesture prevented the woman from walking up to the man.
c. The woman walked up to the man because/after the officer gestured.
d. The officer gestured and the woman walked up to the man.
e. The officer’s gesture led to/resulted in the woman’s walking up to the man.
(11) Traffic light condition:
a. The light’s changing caused/enabled/made/forced/allowed/influenced the
woman to walk up to the man.
b. The light’s changing prevented the woman from walking up to the man.
c. The woman walked up to the man because/after the light changed.
d. The light changed and the woman walked up to the man.
e. The light’s changing led to/resulted in the woman’s walking up to the man.
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Figure 4 Results: Officer (force-generating cause)
4 Results
Recall that we were interested in whether causal expressions were sensitive to two
characteristics of the scenarios: first, the direction of the patient vector compared to
the agent vector, and second, the kind of cause (the force-generating officer versus
the non-force-generating traffic light). If a causal expression were sensitive to the
patient vector, it would show a difference in its acceptability rating between the
CAUSE scenario and the ENABLE scenario. If a causal expression were sensitive to
the kind of cause, it would show a difference in its acceptability rating in the officer
condition versus its acceptability rating in the traffic light condition.
The results4 are shown graphically in Figures 4 and 5. To summarize: Only
certain verbs were always sensitive to both the direction of the patient vector and
the kind of cause. These were the verbs cause, make, force, and allow. Other
expressions were sensitive to the direction of the patient vector only when the cause
4 In what follows, we do not present the results for prevent and the PREVENT scenario. Both behaved
as predicted by Wolff’s (2007) theory: that is, prevent was universally judged unacceptable in
CAUSE and ENABLE scenarios, and nothing other than prevent was judged acceptable in PREVENT
scenarios.
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Figure 5 Results: Traffic light (non-force-generating cause)
was force-generating, but otherwise were not sensitive to the kind of cause: because,
lead to, result in, and enable. Finally, some expressions were sensitive to neither: the
quasi-causal connectives after and and, and the verb influence. These generalizations
are shown below in Table 1.
5 Discussion
Our results provided evidence against the causal pluralism hypothesis and evidence
for the forces-everywhere hypothesis. We will treat these in turn, and then discuss
implications for the division of labor at the grammar-cognition interface, as well the
denotations of both the cases where the denotation seems to explicitly refer to force
interaction (cause, make, force, enable) and the other cases, where the denotation
seems not to explicitly refer to force interaction.
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CAUSE 6= ENABLE CAUSE 6= ENABLE CAUSE = ENABLE
always only if cause is fg always
fg cause 6= cause, make,
non-fg cause force, allow
fg cause = lead to, result in, influence, after, and
non-fg cause enable, because
Table 1 Results categorized
5.1 Structural causal pluralism hypothesis not supported
The structural causal pluralism hypothesis predicts that causal meanings in the
cartographic region of phrase structure that deal with events (AspP and below)
represent causation using force-dynamic force interaction as in Figures 1 - 3, while
causal meanings of connectives, which take propositional arguments, use dependency
causation. This would suggest that verbs should distinguish CAUSE and ENABLE,
while connectives should not.
The prediction made by this hypothesis, given in (8), is not borne out by our
results. First, verbs did not always distinguish CAUSE from ENABLE scenarios:
influence never did, and enable, lead to and result in did only when the cause
was force-generating. Second, the connective because distinguished CAUSE and
ENABLE when the cause was force-generating. Our results, therefore, do not
support the structural causal pluralism hypothesis.
5.2 Forces-everywhere hypothesis supported
Since the structural clausal pluralism prediction was not supported, we should revert
to the null hypothesis where only one theory of causation is used throughout phrase
structure. As discussed above, this single theory has to be a production theory, of
which a force-dynamic theory is one kind. Our force-dynamic theory makes the
predictions in (9) above, namely that assignment of an Agent/Causer role, as well as
whether the cause is force-generating or non-force-generating, should be associated
with a distinction between CAUSE and ENABLE scenarios.
Both predictions were supported by the evidence. Assigning an Agent/Causer
role turned out to be a necessary condition for always distinguishing CAUSE from
ENABLE. It was not a sufficient condition, as enable and influence do not behave
like cause, make, force and allow; but recall that there was never any expectation
that it would be a sufficient condition, since representing the agent vector is not the
only factor determining whether two forces can be represented in the denotation.
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For example, the patient vector also needs to be represented.
Not surprisingly, the quasi-causal connectives and and after proved always
insensitive to the CAUSE/ENABLE distinction, as would be expected given that
their denotations do not seem to represent causation at all. Also in this group is
influence, which does on the other hand seem to explicitly have a causal meaning and
even an Agent/Causer, suggesting that something else is preventing the grammatical
representation of force interaction; see Section 5.5 below for a suggestion as to what.
There was also a class of causal expressions that distinguished CAUSE and
ENABLE only when the cause was force-generating (the officer). This class consists
of enable, the non-agentive verbs lead to, and result in, and the connective because.
The existence of this class supports the second prediction of the forces-everywhere
hypothesis concerning force individuation: the force-generating cause was associated
with distinguishing CAUSE and ENABLE.
Thus, the forces-everywhere hypothesis is supported by our results: the two
predicted factors, namely assignment of an Agent/Causer and whether the cause
is force-generating, have the predicted impact on whether CAUSE and ENABLE
scenarios are distinguished.
5.3 The division of labor between grammar and cognition
These results also shed light on the division of labor between the grammatical level
(i.e., the denotation) and the conceptual level. They do so by indicating how the
aforementioned factors—one grammatical, one conceptual—interact.
A common assumption is that the denotation is the representation of conceptual
structure. This assumption is held explicitly by cognitive linguists such as Talmy,
and is often (though not always) held implicitly by formal semanticists. Our results
here suggest that this assumption is not correct.
The reason is that, if the assumption were correct, we would not expect to see a
mismatch between the two factors. In particular, we would not expect to see force
interaction (a distinction between CAUSE and ENABLE) in the cases where there is
no Agent/Causer represented. But we do see exactly this, namely in the case of lead
to, result in, enable, and because. And in fact we see evidence of force interaction
exactly when there is a force-generating cause, i.e., for a conceptual reason—an
effect that does not show up in the cases where we would suspect both forces are
grammatically represented, namely cause, make, force and allow.
Taken in its entirety, this pattern means we have to distinguish between the
representation of forces at the grammatical level from the representation of forces
at the conceptual level. Whenever a force is represented at the grammatical level
(in the denotation), it is necessarily represented at the conceptual level as well. If
the force is represented grammatically, it can be individuated (even contrary to the
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force individuation criterion in (6)), and compared to another force. However, the
behavior of the class consisting of lead to, result in, enable and because shows us
that there can be forces represented, and compared, at the conceptual level even
though they are not explicitly represented in the denotation, and that if such merely
conceptually-represented forces are not individuated by the denotation, they are
subject to the force individuation criterion.
5.4 Force interaction in the denotation
If cause, make, force, and allow really do represent two forces in their denotations,
how do they do this? We propose the following claim:
(12) Only verbal predicates can express the interaction of two forces in their
denotation.
Plausible support for this claim can be constructed from a relatively minimal exten-
sion of existing theory of “flavors” of the causal head v (Folli & Harley 2005).
As background, there has been much work separating the causal meaning from
the lexical root meaning in the structure of verbs. Kratzer (1996) and Marantz (1997)
use evidence from phrasal idioms to argue that agents do not appear to really be
arguments of the verb they appear with. The argument is that particular patients can
trigger a particular idiomatic reading of a verb, as in (13), while particular agents
rarely if ever do.
(13) a. throw a baseball, throw support behind a candidate, throw a boxing match
b. take a book from the shelf, take a bus to New York, take a nap
c. kill a cockroach, kill a conversation, kill an evening watching TV
These facts are unexpected if agents are arguments of their verbs, as in (14a).
However, if the causal meaning is understood as something (syntactically) distinct
from the lexical meaning, as in (14b), then these facts make sense: the agent is not
syntactically close enough to the lexical root meaning to interact with it. Rather, it is
the causal head v that takes the meaning of the lexical root and specifies the agent’s
causing of the eventuality, represented by the Davidsonian argument e (Davidson
1967).
(14) a. old analysis: λxλe . throw(John, baseball, e)
b. v: λxλe . agent(John)(e) & throw(baseball)(e)
This classic proposal for v, though it does not mention forces, provides a basis for
understanding how agent and patient forces might be represented in verbal semantics,
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and why it might be impossible to represent in the denotation both the agent and
patient force with causal connectives. If we interpret Davidsonian arguments as
forces (f) instead of events (e), as proposed by Copley & Harley (2015) in their
semantics for v, we can see how this plays out.
Copley & Harley, following Folli & Harley’s (2005) categorization of meanings
associated with v into different “flavors” of v, e.g., vdo and vbecome, adapt Dowty’s
(1979) BECOME operator (as in (15a)) to be their vbecome. Added is the idea that an
Agent/Causer-initiated force, arising in an initial situation init(f) in which not-p is
true, leads to the final situation fin(f) in which p is true (as in (15b)).
(15) a. Dowty 1979: BECOME Φ is true at t iff Φ is true at t and Φ is false at t-1.
b. Copley & Harley’s (2015) JvbecomeK = λpλ f . ¬p(init(f)) & p(fin(f))
So, in (15b), a force provokes a change in whether p is true between the initial
situation and the final situation. The Agent/Causer itself is added by a higher Voice
head introducing the SOURCE of the force, understood literally as the source of the
energy. The predicate pi is a predicate of forces.
(16) JVoiceactiveK = λpiλxλ f . pi(f) & SOURCE(x,f)
This makes the denotation of the whole Voice phrase as in (17), where p is the
predicate and x is the Agent/Causer (though strictly speaking, p and x would be
saturated with lexical items by this point):
(17) JVoicePK = λ f . ¬p(init(f)) & p(fin(f)) & SOURCE(x,f)
But note that only one force is mentioned: the Agent/Causer force. To represent
the diagrams in Figures 1 and 2, at least two forces need to be mentioned, and their
result needs to be calculated. In particular the force that represents the patient’s
tendency must be mentioned, in addition to the Agent/Causer force. However,
mentioning the patient directly in the denotation of the v head would seem to be
problematic, as v does not have a direct syntactic relationship with the patient, and
therefore should not have a direct semantic relationship with it either.
Copley & Harley’s framework suggests a way out of this difficulty. They propose
(2015: 148) a notion of what we might call extraneous forces, namely, forces that are
extraneous to the force exerted by the Agent/Causer. To represent these, the notion
of a force being “in” a situation is needed, represented with the symbol <.
An extraneous force f’ in the initial situation of f (i.e., in Talmian terms, the
ground—the situation that is causally prior to the application of f) represents a force
that could come from the patient, but is not required to. Really, all we know is that it
does not come from the agent. The reason why is that an extraneous force f’ that
exists in the initial situation of f cannot be identical to f. The initial situation of f is
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causally prior to f, and f’ is in the initial situation of f; therefore f’ is causally prior
to f. Thus, f’ can serve as a patient vector—though it could also be a force arising
from anything in the initial situation, whether or not it is mentioned in the sentence.
Furthermore, there is a way to represent the resultant vector, by an extraneous
force that is in the final situation of f. The final situation of f depends on the
application of f; it is causally subsequent to f. Thus, any force f” that is in the final
situation of f is one that has already taken f into account.
We can thus propose that certain causal verbs have their own Talmian “flavors”
of v, each of which represent three forces: the Agent/Causer force f, the “patient”
force f’, and the resultant force f”, as in (18). The only difference between (18a) and
(18b) is the negation in (18a).
(18) a. vopposed: λpλ f . ∃f’ < (init(f)): [ ¬p(fin(f’))] & ∃f” < (fin(f)): [ p(fin(f”)) ]
b. valigned: λpλ f . ∃f’ < (init(f)): [ p(fin(f’))] & ∃f” < (fin(f)): [ p(fin(f”)) ]
In (18a) , ∃f’ < (init(f)): [ ¬p(fin(f’))] indicates that there is an extraneous force
in the ground (i.e., in the situation init(f)) that, if unopposed, would result in a final
situation where ¬p was true. For (18b) ∃f’ < (init(f)): [ p(fin(f’))] indicates that there
is an extraneous force in the ground (i.e., in the situation init(f)) that, if unopposed,
would result in a final situation where p was true. In both (18a) and (18b), the
second conjunct ∃f” < (fin(f)): [ p(fin(f”)) ] indicates that there is a resultant force
f” resulting from the agent force f (i.e., in the situation fin(f)) such that, if f” is
unopposed, it results in a final situation where p is true. The denotations in (18a)
and (18b) thus parallel the diagrams given in Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively.
Thus, cause, make and force would be expected to use vopposed and allow would be
expected to use valigned .
If these flavors of v are the right way to think about cause, make, force, and
allow, we can understand both why not all verbs are in that class, and why no clausal
connectives are in that class. For the verbs, not all verbs would be expected to have
these particular flavors of v. While every v head’s semantics would be some variation
on (15b), not every v head’s semantics would be one of the particular variations
given in (18). For the connectives, since they would not be expected to have a v head
at all, the Dowtian semantics in (18a) and (18b) would not be possible. They would
thus not be able to compare both forces explicitly, which is as desired.
5.5 Lack of force interaction in the denotation
Before we conclude, we will say a few speculative words about the denotations of
the causal expressions where there seems to be no force interaction in the denotation.
For verbs without an Agent/Causer such as lead to and result in (and possibly
also enable, though it seems to at least have an agentive reading), it’s very tempting
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to propose that these also use the flavors of v in (18), but without an Agent/Causer
introduced by a Voice head. Lead to and result in would use vopposed while enable
would (might) use valigned . If this were true, though, contrary to expectation from our
results, a causing force would be represented, and in fact even an interaction between
forces would be represented—however, the causing force would not explicitly be
associated with an Agent/Causer, and that might be significant. For reasons of space
we cannot address the consequences of such a proposal here, but it seems worth
investigating.
The verb influence would be one of the verbs that has a different flavor of v
from those in (18). Influence cannot use the denotation in (18a) because although
it assigns an Agent/Causer, there is no evidence of force interaction, as it is never
sensitive to the CAUSE/ENABLE distinction. Instead, influence probably describes
a force that changes the degree to which a proposition holds of an entity. In that
case, it is likely that what is missing is a representation of the patient vector. So,
influence would need a flavor of v similar to vbecome as in (15b), and would have a
Voice head to introduce the Agent/Causer as in (15b); but unlike vbecome, it would
not itself specify which direction the change is in. We will not develop this idea
further here, but see Copley & Harley (Manuscript) for the use of both force and
degree arguments for v denotations.
Finally, the denotations of the quasi-causal connectives and and after must be
distinguished from that of because. All of these being clausal connectives, their
conjuncts are propositional (predicates of situations), but recall that and and after
never distinguish CAUSE from ENABLE, while because distinguishes CAUSE from
ENABLE when the cause is force-generating.
The conjuncts in and and after might be expected to refer to two different
situations, one in each conjunct. After, in particular, would specify a temporal
relation between two situations, but not a causal relation. Pragmatically, however,
for either and or after, the two different situations could be understood as two
causally-related situations sn and sn+1 (see, e.g., Moeschler 1989). On the other
hand, because would explicitly represent two causally-related situations, perhaps
as in (19), where pred(s) picks out the causally preceding situation of a situation s
(Copley & Harley 2015):
(19) JbecauseK = λpλqλ s . p(pred(s)) & q(s)
This difference would capture the fact that because, in contrast to and and af-
ter, shows sensitivity to the CAUSE/ENABLE distinction in the case of a force-
generating cause. This is because for because, we need to understand one situation
(the officer’s gesture) as causing the next situation (the woman’s walking up to
the man). This would plausibly trigger a conceptual-level comparison of forces in
pred(s). On the other hand, with and and after, we need not view their two conjuncts’
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situations as causally related, so the comparison is not necessarily triggered.
6 Conclusion
The goal of this research was to investigate the application of the force-interaction
analysis to a wider range of causal expressions. Two hypotheses were considered:
either that force dynamics was relegated to verbal expressions, or that force dynamics
was relevant throughout the structure. The second hypothesis proved to be supported,
and representation of force interaction was seen to depend on two factors: (i)
whether an Agent/Causer is represented in the syntax, and (ii) what kind of causing
entity is conceptually represented: either one that generates its own force or one
whose force emerges from an interaction with a field. Our findings suggested a
partial independence between conceptual representation of forces and grammatical
representation of forces. The conceptual-level facts hinged on a criterion of force
individuation that requires different forces to have different origins. An addition to
the inventory of flavors of v allowed us to account for why only (certain) verbs can
represent force interaction at the grammatical level, and we speculatively proposed
denotations for the cases without grammatical force interaction.
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